Friday - Saturday, 2 - 3 February 2018, Miami, USA

Overview

Global Competition Review is pleased to present a premier one and a half day international conference, to be held at W South Beach, Miami on 2-3 February 2018, in association with Charles River Associates.

GCR has a preferential booking rate at W South Beach, for the nights of 1 - 3 February (inclusive). For more information, please contact Emma.Brown@lbresearch.com

E-mail Tel: +44 20 3780 4137

Chairs

Margaret Sanderson

Vice President, Charles River Associates (Toronto)

Margaret F. Sanderson has in-depth experience analyzing the economic issues inherent in a wide range of mergers, antitrust/competition, class certification, damages, finance, energy, and telecommunications projects.

Jason Gudofsky

Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP (Toronto)

Jason regularly provides strategic advice to domestic and foreign firms involved in merger and joint venture transactions, including providing risk assessments and navigating reviews through the Canadian Competition Bureau.

Speakers

Juan Arteaga

Crowell & Moring LLP (New York)

Antonio Bavasso

Allen & Overy LLP (London)

Claudia Berg

Senior Legal Director, Antitrust Enforcement, Competition and Markets Authority (London)

Rachel Brandenburger

Visiting Research Fellow, Centre for European & Comparative Law, University of Oxford (Oxford)

Logan Breed

Hogan Lovells International LLP (Washington, DC)

Jeremy Calsyn

Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP (Washington, DC)

Matthew Chiasson

Senior Competition Law Officer, Innovation, Science and Economic Development, Government of Canada (Quebec)

Miguel del Pino

Marval, O'Farrell & Mairal (Buenos Aires)

Michael Egge

Latham & Watkins LLP (Washington, DC)

David Ernst

Antitrust and Competition Law Counsel, 3M (Minneapolis)

Kojiro Fujii

Nishimura & Asahi LPC (Tokyo)

Mark Hamer

Baker McKenzie (Washington, DC)

Ronan Harty

Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP (New York)

Bruce Hoffman

Acting Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission (Washington, DC)

Moritz Holm-Hadulla

Gleiss Lutz (Stuttgart)

Janet Hui

JunHe LLP (Beijing)

Ken Isley

Advisor, Agriculture Division, DowDuPont (Brownsburg)

Nelson Jung

Clifford Chance LLP (London)

Gunnar Kallfaß

Head of Unit, European and German Antitrust, Bundeskartellamt (Bonn)

Michael Knight

Jones Day (Washington, DC)

William Lavery

Baker Botts LLP (Washington, DC)

Ethan Litwin

Dechert LLP (New York)

Anna Lyle-Smythe

Slaughter and May (Brussels)

Greg McCurdy

Director, Litigation and Global Competition Law, Uber Technologies (San Francisco)

Diana Moss

President, American Antitrust Institute (Washington, DC)

Julie North

Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP (New York)

George Paul

White & Case LLP (Washington, DC)

Sharis Pozen

Vice President, Global Competition Law & Policy, General Electric (Washington, DC)

Simon Pritchard

Linklaters LLP (London)

Marie-Cécile Rameau

Bredin Prat (Paris)

Matthew Reilly

Kirkland & Ellis LLP (Washington, DC)

Barbara Rosenberg

Barbosa Müssnich Aragão (São Paulo & Rio de Janeiro)

Debbie Salzberger

Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP (Toronto)

Scott Andrew Sher

Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (Washington, DC)

Greg Sivinski

Assistant General Counsel, Antitrust, Microsoft Corporation (Redmond)

D. Daniel Sokol

Professor, Levin College of Law, University of Florida (Gainesville)

Joshua Soven

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Washington, DC)

Maren Tamke

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (Berlin)

John Terzaken

Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, Washington, DC

Ingrid Vandenborre

Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Brussels)

Susanne Zuehlke

Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (Brussels)

Programme

Thursday, 1 February

7.00pm - 9.00pm: Welcome reception - sponsored by Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP

Friday, 2 February

7.30am - 8.30am: Registration / light breakfast

8.30am - 8.45am: Chairpersons' opening remarks and keynote address

Margaret Sanderson, Vice President, Charles River Associates (Toronto)
Jason Gudofsky, Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP (Toronto)

8.45am - 9.15am: Keynote address

9.15am - 10.45am: Plenary: Economist roundtable

10.45am - 11.15am: Coffee break

11.15am - 12.30pm: (Concurrent sessions)

Merger: No predicted price increase: The entire story or just one act?

Merger analysis has increasingly begun to look beyond classical price effects to consider qualitative factors such as loss of opportunity, loss of choice, barriers to innovation etc. When would it be appropriate, if ever, for an antitrust agency to consider a remedy in a case where the only alleged competitive harm is a qualitative effect without any predicted price increase?

  •  Are horizontal mergers bad for innovation? 
  • How can merger control procedures account for non-price effects where they do not occur alongside price effects?  Are there emerging norms worldwide for the treatment of non-price effects?
  • Which industries are most likely to be most affected in terms of innovation, choice and opportunity?

Antitrust: Deterrence in cartel enforcement - have we passed the breaking point, or is there room left to hurt?

This panel will consider the effect of deterrence on modern cartel compliance.

  •  Headlines of ever increasing cartel fines and long jail sentences (and sentences from new jurisdictions) have receded.  What have we learned?
  • Has the run up in cartel fine levels and jail sentences caught the attention of clients?  Has business behaviour been changed as a result of a deterrent effect? 
  • What has been the effect of deterrence on modern compliance as opposed to other cultural and legal currents / developments that may have also encouraged compliance (e.g., improvements in corporate governance, changes in workplace culture / accountability, more diversity in the workplace, expansion of parent / subsidiary liability, etc.).

12.30pm - 2.00pm: Networking lunch sponsored by Baker McKenzie and lunchtime keynote address

2.00pm - 3.15pm: (Concurrent sessions)

Merger: Rethinking settlement in merger cases

In recent years, settling a merger case has become more difficult. Agencies worldwide have become much more particular about divestiture remedies, as they have become more sceptical of merger-related benefits. As a result, there is a perception among some in the bar that the list of demands from agencies has grown longer, even in cases where such demands may hamper efforts to resolve limited issues in otherwise very pro-competitive transactions. 

The FTC's recent review of merger remedies found that all divestitures ordered during the review period were successful in maintaining or restoring competition in the affected market. This panel will debate whether divestitures are ever an effective way to address concerns in horizontal versus whether the agencies ask too much of merging parties in reaching a settlement.

  • What are the panellist's views of the FTC's recent remedy study and the approach used by the Commission to evaluate its remedy orders?
  • What is the appropriate way to assess the impact and effectiveness of a divestiture in a merger case?
  • Do recent divestiture failures suggest that structural remedies are ineffective? What market characteristics suggest careful consideration should be given to whether a divestiture is effective? How can antitrust agencies make divestitures more effective in these cases?

Antitrust: Market power in e-commerce platforms: Plausible or fantasy?

The modern economy is characterized by a number of online companies that are expanding their operations that touch multiple industry verticals. We have seen the emergence of a number of significant e-commerce platforms that have become ubiquitous. Are these platforms emerging as a potential issue for antitrust regulators or can e-commerce platforms never, as a practical matter, raise antitrust concerns?  How should antitrust regulation and enforcement apply to the emergence of these platforms? Issues to be considered include:

  • Is e-commerce a market on to its own - from either the purchase side or sell side, or is it, and will it always be, subsumed within a broader retail market? Can the analysis change when focusing on e-commerce platforms rather than the activity of selling products online? What is the appropriate approach to market definition when it comes to e-commerce and e-commerce platforms?
  • Will regulators apply traditional concepts of portfolio/conglomerate effects to e-commerce platforms and should they?
  • How should regulators approach economic power issues when considering significant e-commerce platforms - should they consider impacts on suppliers and workers as part of the traditional price/output antitrust analysis?
  • What do regulators need to do to ensure that any regulatory scrutiny and intervention preserves the benefits that large e-commerce verticals create for consumers and the incentives for e-commerce platforms to continue to innovate and become more efficient?
  • Do the EU and US (and other regimes) have the tools necessary to investigate and, if necessary, take action against perceived anticompetitive conduct undertaken by e-commerce platforms without unduly harming consumer welfare or innovation?

3.15pm - 3.45pm: Coffee break

3.45pm - 5.00pm: (Concurrent sessions)

Merger: Merger efficiencies: The great divide

With the exception of Canada, in most jurisdictions, including the US and EU, efficiencies are simply a factor in an integrated rule of reason analysis. Given recent decisions in the US, in which mergers were blocked despite cognizable gains to efficiencies, is the tide likely to turn? This panel will discuss whether efficiencies are likely to become a concern for the US agencies in antitrust analysis - and whether the ‘tipping point' is imminent.

  • How do policy objectives between countries differ with regards to considering efficiencies in antitrust analysis?
  • How have market trends towards liberalization impacted greater consideration of merger efficiencies?
  • How does increased emphasis on innovation impact the extent to which efficiencies are considered in antitrust analysis?
  • How do we define "consumer welfare" and how does this consideration impact efficiency?
  • How are anti-competitive effects and efficiencies quantified for the purposes of the efficiencies defence? How best are qualitative effects assessed and considered?
  • To what extent should cost saving efficiencies be considered in antitrust analysis?
  • Why shouldn't agencies consider out of market efficiencies?

Antitrust: Protectionism: How will it manifest itself in antitrust?

This panel will discuss the ways the rising tide of protectionism - seen in the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the successful "Brexit" vote and the success of non-major party candidates in French elections (as elsewhere)

  • If protectionism is to come to the fore, how are antitrust laws and their application likely to change in countries where leaders pursue policies of economic protectionism?
  • What will change about merger control, for both domestic and international mergers? What will change about enforcement, for both domestic and international conduct?
  • Is it likely that the protectionist wave will counteract the increasing international cooperation between agencies?

5.00pm: Conclusion of day one

Evening: All delegates are invited to attend an all-conference dinner, sponsored by Charles River Associates. Further details to be announced.

Saturday, 3 February

7.30am - 8.30am: Registration / light breakfast

8.30am - 9.00am: Keynote address

9.00am - 10.15am: (Concurrent sessions)

Merger: Small mergers, big issues

As market dynamics shift, particularly in the technology sector, acquisitions that are small by revenues and/or assets standards may have increasingly large competitive effects. In an age where un-monetized data, or potential future disruption can be powerful market forces, are antitrust regulators asking the right questions?

  • Are current merger review thresholds capturing the true competitive effects of smaller mergers? How should regulators assess the value or competitive effects of data-access or potential disruption?
  • What is the appropriate way to look at mergers which present potential anticompetitive effects in the future, rather than a lessening of competition today?
  • Should merger review be based on factors other than revenue or size thresholds, for example, non-price effects, potential network benefits, or platform considerations?

Antitrust: Online cartels: Algorithm or collusion?

The online economy has become increasingly sophisticated, raising questions about the extent to which automatic algorithms sophisticated data analysis can lead to inadvertent, or more sophisticated forms of collusion. As competitors and their algorithms gain deeper vision into each other's pricing strategies, is the potential for online cartel activity is on the rise?

  • How has the flow of information and signalling between competitors changed in the wake of the rise of sophisticated data and algorithmic capabilities?
  • How are global competition enforcement agencies approaching algorithmic price setting?
  • Do the potential pro-competitive effects of sophisticated algorithms outweigh an increased capacity for collusion?
  • Are current antitrust laws equipped to deal with the growing potential for "automatic" or tacit collusion in a big-data world?

10.15am - 10.45am: Coffee break

10.45am - 12.15pm: Plenary: Big data: Essentially yours or essential facility?

This panel will discuss antitrust issues that have arisen from various regulators' consideration of "big data", as well as other considerations related to the regulation of new business models.

  • When does "big data" become an essential facility?
  • When can data collection amount to a barrier to entry? How can antitrust authorities determine when data is "nonrivalrous" versus proprietary to a particular party's products or services?  
  • What considerations must be made to determine which data are substitutes for others? Are there significant differences between mobile "observed" data, data that is attached to an event or user interaction, and "static"/"persistent" data from an antitrust or market definition perspective? What characteristics of a data set raise foreclosure concerns.
  • Who owns data? Is antitrust the best tool to tackle "big data" issues or is privacy law necessarily a key component?
  • How do machines "learn", and what are the differences between basic machine learning and artificial intelligence? Are all "data" created equal, e.g., the "new oil" for these purposes?
  • Do we need to adapt the regulatory paradigm to meet the challenges of the rapidly changing economy? How to find the balance between necessary regulation and the need for innovation and new solutions?
  • What new business models are most difficult to regulate and enforce? Is antitrust equipped to deal with the explosion of online products and services based on machine learning and AI?
  • How might the analysis change for different types of data and different industries?
  • Is a so-called "efficiency offense" - i.e. a call to "level the playing field" by opening a company's data set to competitors - an appropriate policy from an economic or legal perspective?

12.15pm - 12.45pm: Keynote address

12.45pm: Chairpersons' closing remarks and buffet lunch

Venue

W South Beach, 2201 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, FL, 33139, United States

Testimonials

  • "I found it very interesting for law firms and lawyers both EU & US. As a Colombian lawyer it was good to be updated on antitrust issues in other countries"

  • "Learned a lot that i can immediately apply in practice."

  • "A very strong event" Robert Mahnke, Paypal

Ticket Prices

Private Practitioner
Type Price Until
Super Early $1,525  23 December 2017
Early $1,725 20 January 2018
Standard $1,950 3 February 2018

 

In-house/Government Representatives
Type Price Until
Super Early $350  23 December 2017
Early $400 20 January 2018
Standard $450 3 February 2018